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Abstract  
This study explores the puzzle of CEO severance agreements by 
examining the association between the existence of ex ante severance 
agreements and the timeliness of bad news disclosure. The results suggest 
that the single-trigger severance agreement alone plays a role (which may 
not be causal) in eliciting timely disclosure of bad news. The association 
between this severance agreement and timely disclosure of bad news is 
stronger among the CEOs with a highly variable pay structure than among the 
CEOs with a low variable pay structure. In the last year of the CEO’s tenure 
where the performance is poor, the association between this severance 
agreement and timely disclosure of bad news remains positive. The results 
are consistent with the theory of information disclosure by Inderst and 
Mueller (2005) and Laux (2008).  
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1. Introduction 
This study explores the puzzle of chief executive officer (CEO) 
severance agreements by investigating the association between the 
existence of ex ante severance agreements and the timeliness of bad 
news disclosures. CEO severance agreements present a puzzle 
because in addition to annual compensation they guarantee a 
significant amount of money if the CEO’s employment is terminated. 
This is true even if the termination is based on poor or improper 
performance. This promise of payment reduces the menace of 
employment termination that intends to mitigate the moral hazard 
arising from the separation of ownership and management. The large 
payment also directly reduces funds available for business operation 
and sends a negative signal to the incoming executives by rewarding 
failure (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Why do boards sign severance 
agreements with the CEOs? 
Accounting literature has examined this issue from different 
perspectives. In theory, ex ante severance agreements have a positive 
effect on shareholder wealth. Analytical models suggest that severance 
agreements align CEOs’ risk preference with that of the firm (Van 
Wesep 2008), induce CEOs to exert greater effort (Berkovitch et al. 
2000, Almazan and Suarez 2003), or encourage CEOs to disclose 
private information (Inderst and Mueller 2005, Laux 2008). Empirical 
studies have focused on the determinants of granting the severance 
agreements (Rusticus 2006) and the magnitude of the severance 
agreement (Rau and Xu 2008). CEOs in companies with unstable 
performance and strong corporate governance are more likely to have 
severance agreements. Studies have also examined theories 
explaining the value related to severance. Rau and Xu (2008) report 
that the value specified in the ex-ante contract is consistent with the 
hypothesis of human capital risk and inconsistent with the hypothesis 
of wealth transfer by management. Yermack (2006) examines the 
actual size of the ex post severance pay (i.e., separation pay) for 
departing CEOs. He finds evidence consistent with the following 
theories: separation pay is the result of poor governance; separation 
pay serves to reduce management human capital risk; and separation 
pay is used to prevent possible damage by the departing CEO to the 
company. Except for the study by Rusticus (2006), which examines 
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the relation between ex ante severance agreements and CEO turnover, 
empirical studies have not investigated the actual business outcomes 
of having severance agreements in place.1 Taking a step in this 
direction, this study tests the association between ex ante severance 
agreements and the timeliness of bad news disclosures. 
Following prior literature, severance agreements are studied by 
type, the single-trigger severance agreement (ST) and the double-
trigger severance agreement also called the golden parachute (DT). In 
addition, severance agreements are studied by the way boards grant 
them. Boards may grant a single-trigger severance agreement only 
(STONLY), or a double-trigger severance agreement only (DTONLY), or 
both (STDT) to their CEOs. Though both types of severance 
agreements are triggered by the termination of employment, for the 
double-trigger agreement the termination must be within a specified 
period following a defined change in control of the firm. This additional 
trigger of change-in-control may signal the expectation of takeover 
bids (Lambert and Larker 1985). Thus it provides the CEO with a 
disclosure incentive different from the one provided by a single-trigger 
severance agreement. 
Theory predicts that the existence of ex ante severance 
agreements and the timeliness of bad news disclosures are positively 
associated. The separation of ownership and management creates an 
information advantage for CEOs over boards. CEOs will be indifferent 
to disclosure or non-disclosure of their private information if boards do 
not act on the information. It is easy for boards to refrain from 
reacting to good news. However, it is difficult for boards to ignore bad 
news. Given bad news, boards may reallocate resources or even 
replace the CEO. Intervention from boards makes CEOs unwilling to 
reveal their private information, especially bad news. An incentive is 
warranted to induce timely disclosure of bad news (Levitt and Snyder 
1997). Severance agreements promise a compensation to offset CEO 
personal losses from doing so. Severance agreements provide an 
incentive for CEOs to disclose bad news early. 
Using the full sample, a positive association is found between 
the timeliness of bad news disclosures and the single-trigger 
severance agreement alone (STONLY) but not the double-trigger 
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severance agreement alone (DTONLY) or the combined severance 
agreements (STDT). An effect by type, ST or DT, is not found. The 
results are robust after controlling for the possible effect of firm size, 
historical accounting practice, the demand by debt holders, and the 
legal environment of the industry. These findings suggest that the 
single-trigger severance agreement alone plays a role (which may not 
be causal, but is important) in producing timely disclosure of bad 
news. The association is also tested in the context of the CEO’s last 
year of tenure, where performance is poorer than in normal years. It is 
in poor performance years that timely disclosure of bad news is 
especially valuable to boards. The positive association between the 
single-trigger severance agreement (alone) and the timeliness of bad 
news disclosures still exists. 
Theory also predicts that before reaching the disclosure 
decision, CEOs may compare their severance pay with the 
compensation pay. If the severance pay is higher than the 
compensation pay, CEOs are likely to disclose the bad news. If the 
severance pay is lower, CEOs may hide the bad news and keep 
collecting rent. A significant amount of compensation based on 
performance, namely, performance-based pay, enhances the chance of 
the severance pay being greater than the annual compensation in the 
poor performance scenario (Inderst and Mueller 2005, Van Wesep 
2008). Therefore, a highly variable pay structure is expected to be 
accompanied by a stronger association between ex ante severance 
agreements and timely disclosure of bad news. 
This study uses different approaches to determine the CEO’s pay 
structure: the level of the CEO’s performance-based pay, the change 
in the CEO’s performance-based pay over a three-year time period, 
and the volatility of the performance-based pay over the CEO’s tenure. 
A high level of performance-based pay or a wide fluctuation in 
performance-based pay reflects the significant influence of 
performance and indicates a highly variable pay structure for the CEO. 
In the subsamples, the positive association between the single-trigger 
severance agreement and the timeliness of bad news disclosures is 
stronger among a group of CEOs with a highly variable pay structure 
than among a group of CEOs with a low variable pay structure. These 
findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
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This study makes two contributions to the literature. First, it 
complements other work on severance agreements by examining the 
business outcome of severance agreements. The results suggest that 
single-trigger severance agreements play a role in timely disclosure of 
bad news. These findings are consistent with the theory of information 
disclosure by Inderst and Mueller (2005) and Laux (2008). Together 
with other studies, they suggest that the impact of one-time rewards 
on management incentives should not be ignored (Fee and Hadlock 
2003, Grinstein and Hribar 2004, Hartzell et al. 2004, Yermack 2006). 
Second, this study provides insight into corporate governance. The 
results suggest that boards can use the severance agreement as a 
mechanism to elicit early disclosure of bad news. This study also 
provides evidence that pairing the severance agreement with a highly 
variable pay structure may enhance the power of this mechanism. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces severance 
agreements and payments. Section 3 discusses the hypotheses and 
the empirical model. Section 4 explains the sample. Section 5 presents 
the results, followed by the sensitivity tests in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Severance Agreements and Payments  
Severance agreements promise CEOs pay and benefits if they 
lose their position. Severance agreements are roughly classified as 
single-trigger severance agreements and double-trigger severance 
agreements. The difference between the two types is that under the 
double-trigger severance agreement, the employment termination 
must be within a specified period of time following a defined change in 
control over the firm. Both types of severance agreements qualify the 
CEO for the pay and benefits if his employment is terminated without 
cause or he resigns for a good reason. What is considered “cause” 
varies across firms? The most commonly specified causes are “willful 
misconduct”, “moral turpitude” and “failure to perform duties” 
(Schwab and Thomas 2004). The CEO resigns for a “good reason” if 
the firm changes his duty, fails to compensate him as promised, or 
relocates him (Schwab and Thomas 2004). Leaving for a position at 
another firm is not a good reason for resigning from the present 
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employment. Termination for cause or resignation without a good 
reason does not trigger the severance pay under any type of 
severance agreements. 
An ex-ante severance agreement typically provides two times of 
the CEO’s annual salary and bonus, allows the CEO to accelerate the 
vesting of his stock options and restricted stocks, and offers the CEO a 
supplemental executive retirement plan, insurance, and other 
perquisites (Schwab and Thomas 2006, Rau & Xu 2008, Rusticus 
2006, Yermack 2006). A termination without cause or a resignation 
with a good reason awards the departing CEO a similar amount 
(Schwab and Thomas 2004). However, the amount specified in a 
double-trigger severance agreement is usually larger, partly because it 
is the acquiring firm not the current hiring firm that will make the 
payment later (Schwab and Thomas 2004). In ex post settlements, 
CEOs receive more generous pay than what is specified in the 
severance agreement; CEOs removed from office usually receive a 
higher separation pay than CEOs who voluntarily retire (Bebchuk and 
Fried 2003, 2004; Yermack 2006). 
 
3. Hypothesis Development and Empirical Model  
Hypothesis Development 
The separation of ownership and management creates a 
situation in which CEOs have an information advantage over boards 
because they manage the business on a daily basis. A CEO knows his 
own talents and he learns faster than the board whether his human 
capital fits the firm, whether the current corporate strategy could 
succeed, and whether the investment projects will make a profit. The 
separation of ownership and management also means that CEOs want 
to maximize their private benefits, which may not be aligned with 
shareholders’ objectives. When things go wrong, the CEO worries 
about his private benefits and may be unwilling to reveal negative 
information. Releasing bad news has an adverse impact on the CEO’s 
private benefits from different perspectives. Stock markets react 
negatively to bad news (e.g., Skinner 1994). The CEO’s wealth will 
shrink as the result of a falling stock price and of a smaller award of 
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stock options or restricted stocks. The CEO may also face a 
termination of employment, loss of directorship, and difficulty in 
finding another job. With these concerns, some managers admit that 
they delay the disclosure of bad news, hoping that good news will 
come out in the subsequent period and then investors will not notice 
the changes (Graham et al. 2005). Managers intentionally delay bad 
news and gradually leak good news, leading to asymmetric market 
reactions to bad news and good news (Kothari et al. 2009). 
Lack of private information from managers prevents boards 
from taking necessary actions to minimize shareholder loss. For 
example, managers engage in “empire building”, keeping negative 
present value projects going. Without information on projects, boards 
are unable to identify the loss creating projects and terminate those 
projects (Watts 2003). Regardless of their productivity, mangers keep 
resources to themselves. Without information on individual 
productivity, boards cannot re-assign resources for their best use 
(Eisfeldt and Rampini 2008). Managers undertake projects with 
excessive risks that the company cannot afford if managers believe 
that they cannot meet the board’s expectations even given their best 
effort (Van Wesep 2008). Not knowing management’s ability, boards 
may have unrealistic expectations, thus creating pressure for 
excessive risk taking. Overall, access to management’s private 
information is important for boards to maximize shareholder value. 
An incentive is needed to achieve early disclosure of bad news 
from the CEO. Levitt and Snyder (1997) model information flow from 
the agent to the principal. Theoretically, the principal can obtain 
private information from the agent without cost. If the principal 
promises not to intervene in the business operation following the 
information disclosure, the disclosure will not affect the agent’s 
benefits. Therefore, the agent is indifferent to revealing or hiding the 
private information. However, if the principal decides to take actions 
such as reassigning resources or terminating projects based on the 
revealed information, then the agent will be unwilling to reveal the 
information. Therefore, the principal has to reward early disclosure of 
private information if he wishes to avoid non-disclosure or a delay in 
disclosure. Applying this line of reasoning to the CEO (the agent) and 
the board (the principal), if the board does not take actions on the 
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CEO’s private information, then the board does not need to provide 
incentive for the CEO to disclose the information. However, if the 
board wants to take actions given the information, then the board has 
to reward the early revelation of the private information. In practice, it 
is easy for boards not to take actions given good news, but difficult not 
to do so given bad news. An extreme example is that 24 percent of 
CEOs in Yermack’s (2006) sample were forced to leave by their board. 
An ex-ante severance agreement provides an incentive for the 
CEO to disclose bad news early. Inderst and Mueller (2005) argue that 
the CEO evaluates the cost and benefit of revealing bad news. If the 
disclosure costs his job and there is nothing in return, then the CEO 
will try to hide the information. If he receives a severance pay while 
losing his job, then the CEO is better motivated to disclose the bad 
news. Similarly, Van Wsep (2008) argues that severance pay helps the 
board distinguish high quality from low quality CEOs, because 
severance pay induces the low quality CEO to disclose the bad news 
and then leave. The value of the bad news increases in proportion to 
the eagerness that the board has for the information. The bad news 
appears more valuable if the board has an aggressive policy of 
replacing incumbent CEOs (Laux 2008). These theoretical studies 
suggest that severance pay offsets some costs that the CEO will incur 
if the disclosure leads to the termination of his employment, and that 
the expectation of severance pay encourages the CEO to disclose the 
bad news early. This leads to the first hypothesis stated in the 
alternate form: 
H1: The existence of ex ante severance agreements and the 
timeliness of bad news disclosures are positively associated.  
A properly designed compensation package improves the chance 
of a successful transfer of information from the CEO to the board of 
directors (Inderst and Mueller 2005, Van Wesep 2008). To make the 
information transfer work effectively, the CEO’s compensation must 
include stock options or other forms of performance-based pay. This 
part of compensation varies with performance. Before coming to the 
decision to share the news, the CEO will compare the severance pay 
with the expected performance-based pay if he stays. Without a 
severance agreement, the low pay based on poor performance is 
preferred to receiving nothing resulting from being fired. The CEO is 
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financially better off hiding the bad news. With a severance 
agreement, the pay from severance may be greater than the 
compensation pay based on poor performance. The CEO is better off 
disclosing the bad news. A highly variable pay structure lowers the 
CEO’s expected annual pay in the case of poor performance, which in 
turn enhances the relative value of the severance pay, thus providing 
a strong incentive for the CEO to communicate the bad news. 
H2: The association between the existence of ex ante severance 
agreements and the timeliness of bad news disclosures is 
stronger among CEOs with a highly variable pay structure 
than among CEOs with a low variable pay structure. 
 
Empirical Model 
This study examines disclosures that take the form of 
recognizing bad news in accounting earnings. Basu’s (1997) model 
separates good news and bad news and captures the timeliness of the 
disclosures. Good news is indicated by positive stock returns and bad 
news by negative stock returns. The relationship between the stock 
returns and accounting earnings shows the timeliness of news 
disclosure. The Basu model is specified as: 
       EARN = β0 + β1 NEG + β2 RET + β3 NEG * RET + ε           (1) 
Where EARN is earnings before extraordinary items, RET is the 
buy-and-hold return, and NEG is a dummy variable that equals 1 for a 
negative RET, and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on the variable RET 
and the interaction term NEG*RET captures the timeliness of good 
news disclosure and bad news disclosure, respectively. 
The Basu (1997) measures may be contaminated by accounting 
treatment of economic events in the past. To address this concern, the 
market-to-book ratio (MTB) is included as a control variable in this 
study’s empirical model because the composition of equity value at the 
beginning of the year reflects the cumulative effect from accounting 
practice (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). This study also controls for 
other variables that have a potential impact on timely disclosure of 
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bad news. These variables are firm size, leverage and litigation risk. 
They are discussed below. 
The empirical model testing the association between ex ante 
severance agreements and timely disclosure of bad news is as follows: 
 
EARNt = β0 + β1 NEGt + β2 RETt + β3 NEG t*RET t + β4 SIZE t-1  
+ β5NEGt * SIZE t-1+β6RET t*SIZE t-1+ β7 NEG t*RET t*SIZE t-1  
+ β8 MTB t-1 + β9NEGt *MTB t-1+ β10RET t*MTB t-1  
+ β11 NEG t*RET t*MTB t-1 + β12 LEVERAGE t-1  
+ β13 NEGt*LEVERAGE t-1+ β14RET t*LEVERAGE t-1  
+ β15 NEG t*RET t*LEVERAGE t-1 + β16 LIT t-1 + β17NEGt *LIT t-1  
+ β18 RET t*LIT t-1+ β19 NEG t*RET t*LIT t-1 + β20 SA t-1  
+ β21 NEGt *SA t-1+ β22RET t*SA t-1 + β23NEG t*RET t*SA t-1 + εt    (2) 
where NEG*RET*SA is the variable of interest, whose coefficient 
indicates whether the existence of ex ante severance agreements and 
the timeliness of bad news disclosures are positively associated. SA 
captures the existence of the ex-ante severance agreement by type, a 
single-trigger severance agreement (ST) or a double-trigger severance 
agreement (DT), or by the way boards grant them, a single-trigger 
severance agreement alone (STONLY), a double-trigger severance 
agreement alone (DTONLY), or both types of severance agreements 
granted to the same CEO (STDT). The coefficient on NEG*RET*SA is 
expected to be positive. RET is the buy-and-hold stock return over the 
same fiscal year as EARN covers. EARN is earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the year, and NEG is a dummy variable equal to 1 if RET 
is negative and 0 otherwise. 
Following LaFond and Roychowdhury (2007), variables SIZE, 
MTB, and LEVERAGE take the scaled decile rank values of their 
respective underlying measures. Each of these variables is the 
yearly decile rank of its underlying measure from 0 to 9 and then 
scaled by 9. This step makes the values of these variables fall 
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between 0 and 1. The underlying measure of SIZE is the market 
value of equity (MV), that of MTB is the ratio of market value of 
equity to book value of equity (MV/BV), and that of LEVERAGE is 
the ratio of total debt to total assets (DEBT/ASSETS). The predicted 
sign of the coefficient on NEG*RET*SIZE is negative, as large firms 
are less likely to report bad news in a timely manner (Givoly, Hayn, 
and Natarajan 2007, LaFond and Watts 2006). The coefficient on 
NEG*RET*MTB is also predicted to be negative, because a high 
level of unrecorded good news, captured by a high value of MTB, 
lowers the need to record bad news in the subsequent period 
(Roychowdhury and Watts 2007). The expected sign of the 
coefficient on NEG*RET*LEVERAGE is positive because debt holders 
exhibit a strong demand for timely disclosure of bad news (Zhang 
2004, Wittenberg-Moerman 2008, Ball, Robin and Sadka 2008, 
Frankel and Roychowdhury 2007, and Beatty, Weber, and Yu 
2007). Firms in high litigation risk industries tend to disclose bad 
news early, so the coefficient on NEG*RET*LIT is predicted to be 
positive (Basu 1997, Watts 2003). The dummy variable LIT equals 
1 if the standard industry classification (SIC) code of the firm falls 
in one of these ranges, 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 
5200–5961 and 7370-7374 (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994). 
 
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics  
RiskMetrics (formerly, Investor Responsibility Research Center - 
IRRC) provides the severance agreement information. The main 
sample starts with the RiskMetrics governance biannual data from 
1993 to 2006, with 12,531 observations. New governance data 
became available in July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 
2000, February 2002, January 2004 and January 2006. As governance 
was less likely to change immediately after the information update, 
this data is most applicable to the fiscal year ending after the cut-off 
point. Taking the relative relationship between the cut-off month of the 
RiskMetrics data and the firm fiscal year-end month into consideration, 
the RiskMetrics 1993 data are matched with Standard & Poor's 
Compustat financial data for 1993 and 1994, the RiskMetrics 1995 
data with Compustat data for 1995 and 1996, the RiskMetrics 1998 
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data with Compustat data for 1997 and 1998, the RiskMetrics 2000 
data with Compustat data for 1999 and 2000, the RiskMetrics 2002 
data with Compustat data for 2001 and 2002, the RiskMetrics 2004 
data with Compustat data for 2003 and 2004, and the RiskMetrics 
2006 data with Compustat data for 2005 and 2006. There are 11,303 
firm year observations resulting from this step. Out of the 11,303 
observations, 10,904 observations have corresponding stock return 
information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
This study retrieved CEO compensation information from Standard & 
Poor's ExecuComp dataset, which begins with fiscal year 1992. To test 
hypothesis 2, this study requires that ExecuComp has more than three 
observations each year in each two-digit SIC industry. This 
requirement reduces the sample size to 8,803 observations. Another 
34 observations are lost because they have no SIC information. Firms 
in the utility and financial industries (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-
6900) are excluded because such firms are subject to different legal 
constraints. After deleting these firms, the full sample includes 6,986 
observations. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the sample. In Panel A, 
the statistics show that the mean of ST is 7.7% and that of DT is 
63.5%. Approximately 6.8% of CEOs have the single-trigger severance 
agreement alone (STONLY), 62.6% of CEOs have the double-trigger 
severance agreement alone (DTONLY), and 0.9% of CEOs have both 
severance agreements (STDT). This is consistent with other studies of 
severance agreements that more double-trigger severance agreements 
are granted than are single-trigger severance agreements that are not 
contingent on change in firm control (Rusticus 2006; Rau and Xu 
2008). On average, the sample has a positive income before 
extraordinary items scaled by the beginning market value of equity 
(EARN). The sample also shows an average of 13.6% of one year buy-
and-hold return (RET), but 40.3% of the firms experience a negative 
return (NEG). The market value of equity (MV) at the beginning of the 
year varies dramatically across sample firms with an average value of 
6.6 billion. The average market-to-book ratio (MV/BV) is 4.1. Twenty-
two percent of corporate capital comes from debt (DEBT/ASSETS). 
Approximately 32.4% of the sample firms are in industries with high 
litigation risk (LIT). 
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Panel B presents the severance agreements granted by year. 
The grant of single-trigger severance agreements declines from a peak 
of 11.6% to 4.0%. That of the double-trigger severance agreements 
increases over time from a low 50% to 76.5%. The number of double-
trigger severance agreements is much higher than that of single-
trigger severance agreements. 
Panel C reports the correlations between the variables. The 
Pearson product-moment correlations are reported above the diagonal 
and the Spearman rank-order correlations below the diagonal. The 
correlation between ST and DT is significantly negative, with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.307. ST exhibits a positive correlation with 
LIT. DT shows a positive correlation with DEBT/ASSETS. The 
correlation between EARN and RET is significantly positive and the 
correlation between EARN and NEG is significantly negative, 
suggesting that firms’ accounting systems and the stock market 
capture similar economic events. 
 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics         
 Variable   N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
10th 
Pctl 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
90th 
Pctl 
 ST   6986 0.077 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 DT   6986 0.635 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 STONLY   6986 0.068 0.251 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 DTONLY   6986 0.626 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 STDT   6986 0.009 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 EARN   6986 0.025 0.194 
-
0.044 0.022 0.049 0.072 0.101 
 RET   6986 0.136 0.557 
-
0.390 -0.159 0.085 0.329 0.659 
 NEG   6986 0.403 0.490 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 MV   6986 6561 23002 251 537 1286 3892 11862 
 MV/BV   6986 4.051 67.925 1.085 1.606 2.410 3.893 6.291 
 
DEBT/ASSSETS   6986 0.220 0.178 0.000 0.068 0.212 0.329 0.439 
 LIT   6986 0.324 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
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Panel B: Severance Agreements by Year    
Year 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
N 660 801 1108 1030 1139 1157 1091 
 Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
 (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) (Std Dev) 
ST 0.042 0.099 0.116 0.102 0.068 0.066 0.040 
 (0.202) (0.298) (0.321) (0.303) (0.251) (0.248) (0.197) 
DT 0.535 0.532 0.526 0.607 0.681 0.724 0.765 
 (0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.489) (0.466) (0.447) (0.424) 
 
Panel C: Pearson and Spearman Correlations     
 Variable    ST    DT    EARN    RET    NEG    MV   
 
MV/BV   
 DEBT 
/ASSSETS    LIT   
 ST       
 -
0.307   
 
0.015   
 
0.022   
 -
0.002   
 
0.020    0.000    -0.007   
 
0.053  
 DT   
 -
0.307       
 -
0.020   
 -
0.025   
 -
0.005   
 -
0.106    0.005    0.083   
 -
0.060  
 EARN   
 -
0.003   
 
0.003       
 
0.181   
 -
0.177   
 
0.023    0.007    -0.038   
 -
0.067  
 RET   
 
0.008   
 -
0.011   
 
0.429       
 -
0.596   
 -
0.026   
 -
0.012    -0.016   
 
0.026  
 NEG   
 -
0.002   
 -
0.005   
 -
0.374   
 -
0.849       
 
0.011    0.016    0.000   
 
0.059  
 MV   
 -
0.008   
 -
0.022   
 
0.021   
 
0.005   
 -
0.039        0.010    -0.014   
 
0.075  
 MV/BV   
 
0.021   
 -
0.078   
 -
0.085   
 -
0.051   
 
0.035   
 
0.491        0.027   
 -
0.002  
 
DEBT/ASSSETS   
 -
0.026   
 
0.103   
 
0.084   
 -
0.010   
 -
0.010   
 
0.042   
 -
0.189       
 -
0.237  
 LIT   
 
0.053   
 -
0.060   
 -
0.174   
 -
0.031   
 
0.059   
 
0.050   
 
0.145    -0.269    
 
Note: 
Variable definitions: ST  =  1 if the CEO has a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DT  =  1 if the CEO has a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
STONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a single-trigger agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DTONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
STDT  =  1 if the CEO has both a single-trigger severance agreement and a 
double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
EARN  =  earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity 
at the beginning of the year  
RET  =  the buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year  
NEG  =  1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise  
MV  =  the market value of equity at the beginning of the year  
MV/BV  =  the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity at the 
beginning of the year  
DEBT/ASSSETS  =  the ratio of total debt to total assets  
LIT  =  1 if the standard industry classification (SIC) code of the firm falls in one 
of these ranges, 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 
7370-7374, and 0 otherwise  
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In Panel C: The Pearson product-moment correlations are reported 
above the diagonal and the Spearman rank-order correlations below the 
diagonal. Bold text indicates significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level using a 
two-tailed t-test. 
 
5. Results  
In this section, hypothesis 1 will be tested using the full sample. 
Then hypothesis 1 will be tested in the context of the CEO’s last year 
in office (a smaller sample). Since CEO turnover relates to 
performance to some extent, it is expected that performance in the 
CEO’s last year of tenure is worse than in other years, thus more bad 
news will be in this year than in other years. This context provides an 
opportunity to test the association between the ex-ante severance 
agreements and the timeliness of bad news disclosures, where having 
private information from the CEO is more valuable to the board than 
usual. Following that, the full sample will be partitioned based on the 
proxies for the pay structure. Model (2) is run within each subsample, 
i.e., the highly variable pay structure group and the low variable pay 
structure group, to test hypothesis 2. 
Testing H1:  
Full Sample  
Table 2 reports the test results for the association between the 
existence of ex ante severance agreements and the timeliness of bad 
news disclosures. The association is first examined by type of 
severance agreements and then by the way boards grant them to the 
CEO. Column I presents the result for the single-trigger severance 
agreement. The coefficient on NEG*RET*ST is not significant. This 
does not support an effect by the single-trigger severance agreement 
that bad news is disclosed in a timelier manner by CEOs with the 
single-trigger severance agreement than by CEOs without such a 
severance agreement. The coefficients on the control variables are all 
consistent with the literature. The coefficient on NEG*RET*SIZE is 
negative, supporting the inverse relationship between firm size and 
timely disclosure of bad news (-0.214). The coefficient on 
NEG*RET*MTB is also negative (-0.308). The positive coefficient on 
NEG*RET* LEVERAGE (0.117) indicates that firms with a high level of 
debt disclose bad news early. The coefficient on NEG*RET*LIT (0.065) 
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suggests that timely disclosure of bad news is more common in 
industries with high litigation risk. 
Column II reports the results for the double-trigger severance 
agreements. In general, CEOs with the double-trigger severance 
agreement do not disclose bad news in a timelier manner than CEOs 
without such an agreement, as the coefficient on NEG*RET*DT is not 
significant. The results on the control variables are similar to those in 
Column I, thus they are not repeated here. 
Column III separates the CEOs with one severance agreement 
from the CEOs with two severance agreements. The coefficient on 
NEG*RET*STONLY is significantly positive (0.085), and the coefficients 
on NEG*RET*DT and NEG*RET*STDT are not significant. The result 
suggests that bad news is disclosed earlier by CEOs with a single-
trigger severance agreement alone than by CEOs without a severance 
agreement. This is not observed among CEOs with a double-trigger 
severance agreement alone or CEOs with both types of severance 
agreements. Using the full sample, hypothesis 1 is supported for the 
single-trigger severance agreement when it is granted alone to the 
CEO. 
 
TABLE 2 Tests on the association between severance agreements and timely disclosure of bad 
news (Full Sample) 
    
 
     (I)       
 
 (II)   
 
  (III)     
 Parameter        Est    t        Est    t        Est    t       
 Intercept        0.057    4.62    ***    0.053    4.71    ***    0.053    4.45   
 
***  
 NEG        -0.004    -0.25        0.009    0.54        0.006    0.35       
 RET        -0.003    -0.10        0.012    0.42        0.009    0.32       
 NEG*RET    +    0.407    7.00    ***    0.409    6.94    ***    0.397    6.67   
 
***  
 SIZE        0.002    0.21        0.001    0.12        0.001    0.18       
 NEG*SIZE        -0.007    -0.37        -0.006    -0.34        -0.008    -0.42       
 RET*SIZE        0.058    2.98    ***    0.059    2.96    ***    0.058    2.94   
 
***  
 NEG*RET*SIZE    -    -0.214    -3.02    ***    -0.217    -3.04    ***    -0.219    -3.07   
 
***  
 MTB        0.010    1.24        0.012    1.64        0.012    1.51       
 NEG*MTB        -0.013    -0.72        -0.016    -0.88        -0.015    -0.85       
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 RET*MTB        -0.041    -2.24    **    -0.048    -2.88    ***    -0.046    -2.62   
 
***  
 NEG*RET*MTB    -    -0.308    -4.33    ***    -0.300    -4.24    ***    -0.301    -4.26   
 
***  
 LEVERAGE        -0.016    -1.62        -0.015    -1.55        -0.016    -1.57       
 NEG*LEVERAGE        0.041    2.55    ***    0.041    2.61    ***    0.041    2.57   
 
***  
 RET*LEVERAGE        0.022    0.86        0.020    0.80        0.022    0.83       
 
NEG*RET*LEVERAGE   
 +    0.117    2.06    **    0.121    2.14    **    0.113    2.00    **   
 LIT        -0.023    -4.34    ***    -0.021    -4.19    ***    -0.021    -4.24   
 
***  
 NEG*LIT        0.018    1.91    *    0.016    1.72    *    0.017    1.80    *   
 RET*LIT        0.002    0.11        -0.003    -0.25        -0.003    -0.24       
 NEG*RET*LIT    +    0.065    1.82    **    0.069    1.96    **    0.073    2.05    **   
 ST        0.000    0.01                               
 NEG*ST        0.024    1.95    **                           
 RET*ST        0.008    0.57                               
 NEG*RET*ST    +    0.048    0.97                               
 DT                    0.004    1.04                   
 NEG*DT                    -0.016    -2.14    **               
 RET*DT                    -0.015    -2.01    **               
 NEG*RET*DT    +                -0.005    -0.18                   
 STONLY                                0.001    0.14       
 NEG*STONLY                                0.020    1.54       
 RET*STONLY                                0.008    0.61       
 NEG*RET*STONLY    +                            0.085    1.60    **   
 DTONLY                                0.004    1.07       
 NEG*DTONLY                                -0.013    -1.59       
 RET*DTONLY                        -0.013    -1.71      
 NEG*RET*DTONLY    +                            0.013    0.43   
 STDT                                -0.001    -0.04   
 NEG*STDT                                0.005    0.14   
 RET*STDT                                -0.019    -0.38   
 NEG*RET*STDT    +                            -0.068    -0.77   
                                         
 N        6986            6986            6986        
  
R2   
 
 
26.52%   
        
 
26.58%   
        
 
26.73%   
  
 
Note:  
Variable definitions: ST  =  1 if the CEO has a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DT  =  1 if the CEO has a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
STONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DTONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
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STDT  =  1 if the CEO has both a single-trigger severance agreement and a double-trigger 
severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
EARN  =  earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the year  
RET  =  the buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year  
NEG  =  1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise  
SIZE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the market value of equity at the beginning of the 
year, scaled by 9  
MTB  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of the market value of equity to the book 
value of equity at the beginning of the year, scaled by 9  
LEVERAGE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of total debt to total assets, scaled by 9  
LIT  =  1 if the standard industry classification (SIC) code of the firm falls in one of these 
ranges, 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370-7374, and 0 
otherwise  
 
t-values are based on the firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a predicted sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
 
Departing CEOs  
This section examines the timeliness of bad news disclosures in 
the CEO’s last year in office. The departing CEO sample begins with 
ExecuComp 1992-2008, with a specific date of departure for the CEO 
(ExecuComp item: LEFTOFC). CEOs in the financial and utility 
industries or departing due to death are deleted. The number of 
observations declines from 2,820 to 2,289 because of these 
restrictions. Next, interim CEOs are dropped from the sample because 
over their short CEO time, an interim CEO is unlikely to have much 
influence on the company’s information disclosure policy. An interim 
CEO is defined as being in office for less than one year. This requires 
comparing the date of becoming the CEO and the date of departing as 
the CEO. If the information of the starting date (ExecuComp item: 
BECAMECEO) is missing from ExecuComp, the data is then collected by 
hand from the company’s proxy statement or 8-K or news release. 
Some of the dates retrieved from ExecuComp appear to be mistakes 
because the year of BECAMECEO is later than the fiscal year they are 
shown as the CEO. For example, ExecuComp records Bernard Gordon 
as the CEO of Analogic Corp in 1999 and 2003 while his dates of 
BECAMECEO are all listed as November 8th, 2006. After checking the 
public records, it became clear that Bernard Gordon was the CEO of 
the Company from 1973 to 2000, from 2002 to 2003, and then 
became the CEO again in 2006. ExecuComp updates all the historical 
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dates of becoming the CEO and the departure as the CEO for returned 
CEOs like Bernard Gordon. For cases like this, this study only keeps 
the CEO’s last departure from the company as a regular CEO. After 
deleting the interim CEOs, the departing CEO sample has 2,117 
observations. 
This study intends to examine the disclosure practice in the 
departing CEO’s last year of significant influence. 2 A fiscal year is 
defined to be under the CEO’s significant influence if the CEO is in 
office for more than nine months of the fiscal year. This is determined 
by comparing the CEO’s departure date with the firm’s fiscal year-end 
date. Specifically, if the CEO was in office for more than nine months 
in the fiscal year of his departure, then the year of his departure is the 
last fiscal year under his significant influence. Otherwise, the last fiscal 
year under his significant influence would be the fiscal year before the 
year of his departure. The cut-off point of nine months is a subjective 
but reasonable choice. It ensures that the disclosure practice is 
primarily under the departing CEO’s not the incoming CEO’s influence. 
The departing CEO sample is matched with the RiskMetrics 
severance data (1990-2006) and Compustat financial data and CRSP 
stock price information. Some observations are lost during this 
matching process because of missing data in one or more of the three 
datasets. The final sample includes 1,568 observations. The 
descriptive statistics for this sample are reported in Table 3. The 
statistics support the conjecture that the performance in the CEO’s last 
year of tenure is worse than in other years. Earnings in Table 3 are 
lower (EARN = -0.010), compared to those reported in Table 1 (EARN 
= 0.025). Stock returns are lower as well (RET =4.9%, NEG =48.7% 
vs. RET =13.6%, NEG =40.3% in Table 1). 
The severance agreement statistics for these departing CEOs 
are similar to those for the CEOs in the full sample: on average, 7.5% 
of the CEOs have the single-trigger severance agreement; 6.3% of 
them only have this agreement, while 1.3% of them have this 
agreement in addition to a double-trigger severance agreement. 
Approximately 65.9% of the CEOs have the double-trigger severance 
agreement; 64.7% of them have this agreement alone, while the other 
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1.3% of the CEOs have both a single-trigger severance agreement and 
a double-trigger severance agreement. 
TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics (Departing CEOs) 
Variable   N Mean 
Std 
Dev 
10th 
Pctl 
Lower 
Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile 
90th 
Pctl 
 ST   1568 0.075 0.264 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 DT   1568 0.659 0.474 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 STONLY   1568 0.063 0.242 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 DTONLY   1568 0.647 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 STDT   1568 0.013 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 EARN   1568 -0.010 0.261 
-
0.121 0.008 0.044 0.067 0.090 
 RET   1568 0.049 0.501 
-
0.473 -0.238 0.012 0.241 0.561 
 NEG   1568 0.487 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 MV   1568 7891 25233 238 559 1533 4798 15833 
 MV/BV   1568 3.593 20.008 1.061 1.574 2.342 3.870 6.541 
 
DEBT/ASSSETS   1568 0.220 0.174 0.000 0.084 0.210 0.322 0.436 
 LIT   1568 0.333 0.471 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Variable definitions: ST  =  1 if the CEO has a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DT  =  1 if the CEO has a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
STONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
DTONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
STDT  =  1 if the CEO has both a single-trigger severance agreement and a double-
trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
EARN  =  earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity 
at the beginning of the year  
RET  =  the buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year  
NEG  =  1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise  
MV  =  the market value of equity at the beginning of the year  
MV/BV  =  the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity at the 
beginning of the year  
DEBT/ASSSETS  =  the ratio of total debt to total assets  
LIT  =  1 if the standard industry classification (SIC) code of the firm falls in one of 
these ranges, 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370-
7374, and 0 otherwise  
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2012): pg. 177-207. DOI. This article is © 2012 Sage Publications 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. 2012 Sage Publications does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from 2012 Sage Publications. 
21 
 
The analyses in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 2. Column I 
presents the results of the association between the existence of a 
single-trigger severance agreement and the timely disclosure of bad 
news. Column II reports the association between the existence of a 
double-trigger severance agreement and the timely disclosure of bad 
news. Column III separates the CEOs with one severance agreement 
from the CEOs with both severance agreements. The coefficient on 
NEG*RET*ST is significantly positive (0.395). It suggests that in the 
CEO’s last year of strong influence, bad news is revealed earlier by 
CEOs with a single-trigger severance agreement than by CEOs without 
such an agreement. Column II shows that this phenomenon is not 
observed among CEOs with the double-trigger severance agreement, 
as evidenced by the non-significant coefficient on NEG*RET*DT. 
Consistent with the result in Table 2, the coefficient on 
NEG*RET*STONLY is significantly positive (0.416), indicating the 
strong role played by the single-trigger severance agreement in 
eliciting timely disclosure of bad news. Neither the coefficient on 
NEG*RET*DTONLY nor the one on NEG*RET*STDT is significant. The 
results in this table provide additional evidence that the existence of 
ex ante single-trigger severance agreements and timeliness of bad 
news disclosure are positively related. The single-trigger severance 
agreement plays an important role in eliciting early disclosure of bad 
news. The coefficients on the control variables are all in the predicted 
direction. The coefficients are significantly negative on NEG*RET*SIZE 
and NEG*RET*MTB. The coefficients on NEG*RET*LEVERAGE and 
NEG*RET* LIT lose their significance but are still positive. 
 
TABLE 4 Tests on the association between severance agreements and timely 
disclosure of bad news (Departing CEOs) 
         (I)         (II)      (III)     
 Parameter        Est    t        Est    t        Est    t       
 Intercept        0.022    1.13        0.026    1.37        0.028    1.43       
 NEG        0.064    1.49        0.083    1.79    *    0.069    1.54       
 RET        -0.061    -1.01        -0.046    -0.81        -0.038    -0.69       
 NEG*RET   
 +    0.862    5.25    ***    0.944    5.23    ***    0.886    4.83   
 
***  
 SIZE        0.016    0.90        0.017    0.98        0.017    0.97       
 NEG*SIZE        -0.041    -0.79        -0.038    -0.73        -0.044    -0.84       
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 RET*SIZE        0.038    0.77        0.027    0.56        0.027    0.54       
 NEG*RET*SIZE    -    -0.376    -2.20    **    -0.362    -2.10    **    -0.372    -2.14    **   
 MTB        0.053    2.37    **    0.048    2.18    **    0.048    2.15    **   
 NEG*MTB        -0.080    -1.40        -0.081    -1.43        -0.073    -1.28       
 RET*MTB        -0.010    -0.14        0.002    0.02        0.003    0.04       
 NEG*RET*MTB   
 -    -0.669    -3.33    ***    -0.692    -3.47    ***    -0.675    -3.31   
 
***  
 LEVERAGE        -0.024    -1.24        -0.021    -1.05        -0.021    -1.05       
 NEG*LEVERAGE        -0.011    -0.22        -0.014    -0.28        -0.013    -0.28       
 RET*LEVERAGE        0.105    1.87    *    0.098    1.72    *    0.101    1.77    *   
 NEG*RET*LEVERAGE    +    -0.190    -1.20        -0.173    -1.08        -0.185    -1.18       
 LIT   
     -0.036    -3.50    ***    -0.033    -3.26    ***    -0.033    -3.20   
 
***  
 NEG*LIT        0.059    2.29    **    0.054    2.20    **    0.053    2.13    **   
 RET*LIT        0.038    1.24        0.028    0.98        0.025    0.90       
 NEG*RET*LIT    +    0.106    1.07        0.102    1.08        0.110    1.15       
 ST        0.018    0.79                               
 NEG*ST        0.075    1.11                               
 RET*ST        -0.067    -0.97                               
 NEG*RET*ST    +    0.395    1.67    *                           
 DT                    -0.006    -0.65                   
 NEG*DT                    -0.019    -0.82                   
 RET*DT                    -0.020    -0.83                   
 NEG*RET*DT    +                -0.091    -0.96                   
 STONLY                                0.008    0.32       
 NEG*STONLY                                0.079    1.03       
 RET*STONLY                                -0.099    -1.18       
 NEG*RET*STONLY    +                            0.416    1.52    *   
 DTONLY                                -0.008    -0.91       
 NEG*DTONLY   
                    
 -
0.006   
 -0.26      
 RET*DTONLY                                -0.028    -1.22       
 NEG*RET*DTONLY    +                            -0.036    -0.39       
 STDT                                0.030    1.87    **  
 NEG*STDT                                0.031    0.45       
 RET*STDT                                -0.042    -0.83       
 NEG*RET*STDT    +                            0.165    0.82       
                                         
 N        1568            1568            1568        
 R2   
 
 
30.09%   
        
 
29.91%   
        
 
30.36%   
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Note:  
Variable definitions: ST  =  1 if the CEO has a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DT  =  1 if the CEO has a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
STONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
DTONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
STDT  =  1 if the CEO has both a single-trigger severance agreement and a double-
trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
EARN  =  earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity 
at the beginning of the year  
RET  =  the buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year  
NEG  =  1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise  
SIZE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the year, scaled by 9  
MTB  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of the market value of equity to 
the book value of equity at the beginning of the year, scaled by 9  
LEVERAGE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
scaled by 9  
LIT  =  1 if the standard industry classification (SIC) code of the firm falls in one 
of these ranges, 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 
7370-7374, and 0 otherwise  
 
t-values are based on the firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a predicted sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
 
Testing H2:  
Compensation Structure Determined by the Level of 
Performance-Based Pay  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the relationship between the 
existence of severance agreements and timely disclosure of bad news 
will be stronger among CEOs with a highly variable pay structure. How 
to determine a highly variable pay structure versus a low variable pay 
structure is not clear in the literature and it is a difficult issue. A highly 
variable pay structure means that the CEO has a large component of 
his compensation based on performance. This compensation design 
leads to a high amount of performance-based pay for a year of good 
performance, while a low amount for a year of poor performance. By 
contrast, a low variable pay structure is less affected by performance. 
It produces a low amount of performance-based pay. An extreme 
example is that regardless of performance a CEO’s performance-based 
pay is always zero if he only works on salary. A highly variable pay 
structure does not always mean a high amount of performance-based 
pay in annual compensation. However, a high amount of performance-
based pay is a signal of a highly variable pay structure for the CEO. 
Based on this property, the full sample is partitioned into a highly 
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variable pay structure group and a low variable pay structure group. 
Models are run within each subsample. 
CEOs’ performance-based pay information is obtained from 
ExecuComp. The proxy for performance-based pay, PBP, treats salary 
as the only fixed component paid to the CEO. The performance-based 
pay is calculated as the total annual compensation minus salary, 
where the total annual compensation (ExecuComp item: TDC1) 
includes salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of 
restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using 
Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other 
compensations. 
CEO’s performance-based pay may be affected by the overall 
economy of the year and industry-specific differences in the design of 
compensation package. Therefore, CEO performance-based pays are 
sorted by year and industry (defined by the 2-digit SIC code), using all 
the observations available in ExecuComp. These observations are then 
assigned to four groups of equal size, with the lowest performance-
based pay in group 1 and the highest performance-based pay in group 
4.3 Group 4 is the highly variable pay structure group. The remaining 
observations of the full sample constitute the low variable pay 
structure group. 
Table 5 reports the results, with Panel A for the highly variable 
pay structure group and Panel B for the low variable pay structure 
group. Panel A Column I presents the results for the single-trigger 
severance agreement. The coefficient on NEG*RET*ST is significantly 
positive (0.072), indicating that among CEOs with a highly variable 
pay structure, bad news is disclosed earlier by CEOs with a single-
trigger severance agreement than by CEOs without such an 
agreement. The coefficient is still negative on NEG*RET*MTB and 
positive on NEG*RET*LIT. The coefficients on NEG*RET*SIZE and 
NEG*RET*LEVERAGE become not significant but are in the predicted 
direction. Column II tests for the double-trigger severance agreement. 
The coefficient on NEG*RET*DT is not significant. This indicates that 
CEOs with this severance agreement do not disclose bad news in a 
timelier manner. In Column III, the results suggest again that CEOs 
with the single-trigger severance agreement alone demonstrate the 
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tendency to disclose bad news earlier. CEOs with the double-trigger 
severance agreement alone or with both types of severance 
agreements do not show this tendency. The coefficient on 
NEG*RET*STONLY is 0.074 in this subsample. 
Panel B presents the analysis for the association between ex 
ante severance agreements and timely disclosure of bad news within 
the low variable pay structure subsample. The coefficients on the 
variables of interest, NEG*RET*ST, NEG*RET*DT, NEG*RET*STONLY, 
NEG*RET*DTONLY and NEG*RET*STDT, are not significant. The 
results indicate that among CEOs with a low variable pay structure, 
bad news is not revealed earlier by CEOs with a severance agreement 
than by CEOs without a severance agreement. Among these CEOs, 
severance agreements do not play a role in eliciting timely disclosure 
of bad news. Turning to the control variables, the signs of the 
coefficients on NEG*RET*SIZE, NEG*RET*MTB, and 
NEG*RET*LEVERAGE are consistent with the literature. The coefficient 
on NEG*RET*LIT loses its significance. Combining the results in Panel 
A and Panel B, H2 is supported. 
TABLE 5 Tests on the association between severance agreements and timely 
disclosure of bad news (Sample Partitioned by Performance-Based Pay Level) 
Panel A: Highly Variable Pay Structure        
         (I)         (II)         (III)     
 Parameter        Est    t        Est    t        Est    t       
 Intercept       0.064 8.05  ***   0.061 6.30  ***   0.065 7.02 
 
***  
 NEG       0.003 0.16     0.017 0.75     0.011 0.48     
 RET       0.021 1.45     0.021 1.16     0.016 0.90     
 NEG*RET   
 
+   0.280 4.02  ***   0.308 3.67  ***   0.298 3.36 
 
***  
 SIZE       0.002 0.30     0.004 0.50     0.004 0.42     
 NEG*SIZE       0.040 1.78  *   0.037 1.68  *   0.037 1.62     
 RET*SIZE       0.014 1.02     0.012 0.87     0.011 0.75     
 NEG*RET*SIZE    -   0.110 1.12     0.112 1.15     0.106 1.06     
 MTB       -0.016 -1.68  *   -0.016 -1.56     -0.016 -1.57     
 NEG*MTB       -0.067 -2.78  ***   -0.068 -2.79  ***   -0.066 -2.68 
 
***  
 RET*MTB       -0.028 -1.57     -0.028 -1.38     -0.027 -1.37     
 NEG*RET*MTB    -   -0.492 -4.34  ***   -0.495 -4.33  ***   -0.486 -4.09 
 
***  
 LEVERAGE       0.000 0.03     0.001 0.13     -0.001 -0.10     
 NEG*LEVERAGE       0.009 0.41     0.008 0.39     0.011 0.50     
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 RET*LEVERAGE       0.015 0.98     0.013 0.81     0.019 1.22     
 NEG*RET*LEVERAGE   
 
+   0.045 0.55     0.050 0.61     0.047 0.57     
 LIT       -0.019 -3.70  ***   -0.019 -3.74  ***   -0.020 -4.11 
 
***  
 NEG*LIT       0.046 3.59  ***   0.044 3.41  ***   0.046 3.53 
 
***  
 RET*LIT       -0.001 -0.07     -0.001 -0.10     0.003 0.34     
 NEG*RET*LIT   
 
+   0.149 2.69  ***   0.145 2.58  ***   0.141 2.50 
 
***  
 ST       -0.001 -0.09                 
 NEG*ST       0.016 1.00                 
 RET*ST       -0.015 -1.11                 
 NEG*RET*ST   
 
+   0.072 1.38  *               
 DT             0.003 0.49           
 NEG*DT             -0.015 -1.24           
 RET*DT             0.001 0.15           
 NEG*RET*DT   
 
+         -0.034 -0.78           
 STONLY                   -0.005 -0.44     
 NEG*STONLY                   0.015 0.91     
 RET*STONLY                   -0.004 -0.32     
 NEG*RET*STONLY   
 
+               0.074 1.25  *   
 DTONLY                   0.000 0.02     
 NEG*DTONLY                         -0.010 
           
-0.81  
 RET*DTONLY                   0.003 0.37     
 NEG*RET*DTONLY   
 
+               -0.022 -0.46     
 STDT                   0.021 0.81     
 NEG*STDT                   -0.045 -0.89     
 RET*STDT                   -0.068 -4.01 
 
***  
 NEG*RET*STDT   
 
+               -0.044 -0.39     
                       
 N       1806      1806      1806   
 R2    28.03%      27.97%      28.27%  
           
           
Panel B: Low Variable Pay Structure        
         (I)         (II)      (III)     
 Parameter        Est    t        Est    t        Est    t       
 Intercept       0.057 3.88  ***   0.052 3.89  ***   0.053 3.64 
 
***  
 NEG       -0.011 -0.57     0.002 0.13     -0.002 -0.09     
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 RET       -0.013 -0.34     0.013 0.39     0.005 0.14     
 NEG*RET   
 
+   0.433 6.26  ***   0.421 6.03  ***   0.416 5.83 
 
***  
 SIZE       -0.009 -0.94     -0.009 -0.88     -0.008 -0.85     
 NEG*SIZE       -0.024 -1.13     -0.024 -1.13     -0.025 -1.20     
 RET*SIZE       0.095 3.94  ***   0.091 3.72  ***   0.091 3.81 
 
***  
 NEG*RET*SIZE    -   -0.391 -5.20  ***   -0.388 -5.16 
 
***   -0.389 -5.19 
 
***  
 MTB       0.026 2.58  ***   0.029 2.85  ***   0.028 2.73 
 
***  
 NEG*MTB       0.003 0.15     0.000 0.01     0.002 0.07     
 RET*MTB       -0.065 -2.61  ***   -0.073 -3.03  ***   -0.069 -2.84 
 
***  
 NEG*RET*MTB    -   -0.180 -2.20  **   -0.171 -2.09  **   -0.176 -2.14  **   
 LEVERAGE       -0.023 -1.93  **   -0.020 -1.75  *   -0.022 -1.82  *   
 NEG*LEVERAGE       0.061 3.18  ***   0.060 3.16  ***   0.061 3.15 
 
***  
 RET*LEVERAGE       0.024 0.72     0.017 0.56     0.022 0.66     
 NEG*RET*LEVERAGE   
 
+   0.165 2.41  **   0.174 2.56 
 
***   0.163 2.35  **   
 LIT       -0.023 -3.79  ***   -0.021 -3.47  ***   -0.021 -3.52 
 
***  
 NEG*LIT       0.008 0.71     0.006 0.56     0.006 0.56     
 RET*LIT       0.002 0.10     -0.005 -0.29     -0.005 -0.34     
 NEG*RET*LIT   
 
+   0.039 0.95     0.047 1.14     0.051 1.23     
 ST       0.000 0.01                 
 NEG*ST       0.027 1.93  **               
 RET*ST       0.024 1.21                 
 NEG*RET*ST   
 
+   0.030 0.56                 
 DT             0.004 0.79           
 NEG*DT             -0.015 -1.67  *         
 RET*DT          -0.023  -2.06    **    
 NEG*RET*DT   
 
+         0.006 0.18        
 STONLY                   0.003 0.31  
 NEG*STONLY                   0.020 1.34  
 RET*STONLY                   0.021 1.16  
 NEG*RET*STONLY   
 
+               0.063 1.06  
 DTONLY                   0.004 0.83  
 NEG*DTONLY                   -0.012 -1.25 
 RET*DTONLY                   -0.019 -1.59 
 NEG*RET*DTONLY   
 
+               0.020 0.54  
 STDT                   -0.017 -0.48 
 NEG*STDT                   0.045 0.96  
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 RET*STDT                   0.000 0.01  
 NEG*RET*STDT   
 
+               -0.035 -0.34 
                       
 N       5180      5180      5180   
 R2    27.13%      27.15%      27.34%  
 
Note: Using all data available in ExecuComp, CEO performance-based pays (PBP) are sorted by 2-digit SIC industry 
classification and year. The observations are assigned to four groups of equal size, with the lowest performance-
based pay in group 1 and the highest performance-based pay in group 4. CEOs who have a performance-based pay 
in group 4 are classified as highly-variable-pay-structure CEOs (Panel A). CEOs with a performance-based pay in 
other groups are low-variable-pay-structure CEOs (Panel B). This information is then matched with the full sample 
described in Table 1. 
Variable definitions: PBP  =  the total annual compensation subtracts salary  
ST  =  1 if the CEO has a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DT  =  1 if the CEO has a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
STONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
DTONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
STDT  =  1 if the CEO has both a single-trigger severance agreement and a double-
trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
EARN  =  earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity 
at the beginning of the year  
RET  =  the buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year  
NEG  =  1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise  
SIZE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the market value of equity at the beginning 
of the year, scaled by 9  
MTB  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of the market value of equity to 
the book value of equity at the beginning of the year, scaled by 9  
LEVERAGE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of total debt to total assets, scaled 
by 9  
LIT  =  1 if the standard industry classification (SIC) code of the firm falls in one of 
these ranges, 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370-
7374, and 0 otherwise  
 
t-values are based on the firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a predicted sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
Compensation Structure Determined by Change in 
Performance-Based Pay  
The classifications of the compensation structure based on the 
level of performance-based pay runs the risk of misclassifying some 
CEOs with a highly variable pay structure as CEOs with a low variable 
pay structure, if the CEO has a year of poor performance. In this 
section, the change in the performance-based pay level is the factor 
that defines the pay structure. As in the previous section, CEOs’ 
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performance-based pays are first sorted and then assigned to one of 
the four groups specifically for the year and industry. For purposes of 
this section, if the CEO’s performance-based pay moves up or down 
across more than two groups in any of the following two years, then 
the CEO has a compensation package with a highly variable pay 
structure.4 
This change in the performance-based pay sample with the 
necessary severance, financial and stock returns data includes 5,767 
observations. Among them, 897 observations experienced large 
changes in three years and thus they are in the highly variable pay 
structure group. The remaining 4,870 observations are in the low 
variable pay structure group. Panel A of Table 6 reports the analysis 
using the highly variable pay structure group, and Panel B reports the 
analysis using the low variable pay structure group. 
The coefficient on NEG*RET*ST, NEG*RET*DT or 
NEG*RET*DTONLY is not significant in either Panel. The coefficient on 
NEG*RET*STDT is significantly negative in Panel A. This suggests that 
CEOs with both severance agreements are less likely to disclose bad 
news early. By contrast, the coefficient on NEG*RET*STONLY is 
significant in both Panel A (0.159) and Panel B (0.090), supporting a 
positive association between the single-trigger severance agreement 
alone and the early disclosure of bad news. Further tests show that the 
coefficient on NEG*RET*STONLY in Panel A is significantly larger than 
the coefficient in Panel B (t=25.53, p=0.00). This provides evidence 
that the positive association between the single-trigger severance 
agreement alone and the timeliness of bad news disclosure is stronger 
among CEOs with a highly variable pay structure than among CEOs 
with a low variable pay structure. Therefore, H2 is supported. 
TABLE 6 Tests on the association between severance agreements and timely disclosure of 
bad news (Sample Partitioned by Change in Performance-Based Pay Level) 
Panel A: Highly Variable Pay Structure        
         (I)         (II)      (III)     
 Parameter        Est    t        Est    t        Est    t       
 Intercept        0.020    1.02        0.013    0.63        0.006    0.29       
 NEG        0.038    1.19        0.044    1.23        0.052    1.42       
 RET        0.055    1.92    *    0.068    2.30    **    0.081    2.60   
 
***  
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 NEG*RET   
 
+    0.273    2.42    **    0.269    2.21    **    0.252    2.10    **   
 SIZE        -0.005    -0.27        -0.005    -0.26        0.000    -0.01       
 NEG*SIZE        0.017    0.46        0.018    0.49        0.011    0.29       
 RET*SIZE        0.052    1.44        0.051    1.52        0.039    1.11       
 NEG*RET*SIZE    -    -0.046    -0.34        -0.045    -0.33        -0.036    -0.27       
 MTB        0.035    1.44        0.037    1.52        0.036    1.51       
 NEG*MTB        -0.091    -2.03    **    -0.092    -2.06    **    -0.093    -2.09    **   
 RET*MTB        -0.077    -1.87    *    -0.082    -2.04    **    -0.083    -2.07    **   
 NEG*RET*MTB    -    -0.440    -3.20    ***    -0.427    -3.12    ***    -0.436    -3.20   
 
***  
 LEVERAGE        0.008    0.42        0.006    0.35        0.009    0.47       
 NEG*LEVERAGE        0.036    1.20        0.040    1.33        0.032    1.07       
 RET*LEVERAGE        -0.003    -0.08        -0.003    -0.08        -0.012    -0.35       
 NEG*RET*LEVERAGE   
 
+    0.191    1.99    **    0.200    2.09    **    0.189    2.01    **   
 LIT        0.180    2.51    ***    0.177    2.50    ***    -0.015    -1.41       
 NEG*LIT        -0.015    -1.43        -0.013    -1.27        0.015    0.72       
 RET*LIT        0.016    0.74        0.014    0.65        -0.016    -0.83       
 NEG*RET*LIT   
 
+    -0.016    -0.82        -0.019    -0.96        0.178    2.50   
 
***  
 ST        0.006    0.41                               
 NEG*ST        0.001    0.03                               
 RET*ST        -0.002    -0.09                               
 NEG*RET*ST   
 
+    0.070    0.98                               
 DT                    0.015    1.45                
 NEG*DT                    -0.015    -0.82                
 RET*DT                    -0.024    -1.78    *            
 NEG*RET*DT   
 
+                0.008    0.14                
 STONLY                                0.018    1.08       
 NEG*STONLY                                0.000    -0.01       
 RET*STONLY                                -0.024    -1.07       
 NEG*RET*STONLY   
 
+                            0.159    2.04    **   
 DTONLY                                0.019    1.67       
 NEG*DTONLY                       
 -
0.016    -0.80      
 RET*DTONLY                                -0.031    -2.22    **  
 NEG*RET*DTONLY   
 
+                            0.039    0.60       
 STDT                                -0.005    -0.19       
 NEG*STDT                                -0.034    -0.67       
 RET*STDT                                0.040    0.87       
 NEG*RET*STDT   
 
+                            -0.173    -1.71    **  
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 N        897            897            897        
 R2    
 
33.37%           
 
33.45%           
 
33.83%     
           
Panel B: Low Variable Pay Structure        
         (I)         (II)      (III)     
 Parameter        Est    t        Est    t        Est    t       
 Intercept        0.065    4.95    ***    0.065    5.33    ***    0.065    5.24   
 
***  
 NEG        -0.009    -0.53        -0.003    -0.16        -0.006    -0.35       
 RET        -0.008    -0.25        0.000    -0.01        -0.003    -0.08       
 NEG*RET   
 
+    0.375    6.34    ***    0.364    6.27    ***    0.348    6.00   
 
***  
 SIZE        -0.003    -0.29        -0.005    -0.46        -0.005    -0.51       
 NEG*SIZE        0.001    0.07        0.003    0.16        0.003    0.16       
 RET*SIZE        0.079    3.20    ***    0.085    3.29    ***    0.085    3.31   
 
***  
 NEG*RET*SIZE    -    -0.187    -2.55    ***    -0.195    -2.65    ***    -0.198    -2.7   
 
***  
 MTB        0.003    0.36        0.005    0.74        0.004    0.57       
 NEG*MTB        0.001    0.04        -0.002    -0.11        -0.001    -0.04       
 RET*MTB        -0.045    -2.43    **    -0.053    -3.22    ***    -0.049    -2.73   
 
***  
 NEG*RET*MTB    -    -0.234    -3.38    ***    -0.221    -3.26    ***    -0.223    -3.33   
 
***  
 LEVERAGE        -0.014    -1.45        -0.013    -1.33        -0.013    -1.3       
 NEG*LEVERAGE        0.028    1.85    *    0.027    1.81    *    0.027    1.82    *   
 RET*LEVERAGE        0.015    0.56        0.014    0.51        0.012    0.47       
 NEG*RET*LEVERAGE   
 
+    0.046    0.85        0.045    0.84        0.044    0.82       
 LIT        -0.022    -3.93    ***    -0.022    -3.92    ***    -0.022    -3.98   
 
***  
 NEG*LIT        0.013    1.47        0.014    1.53        0.013    1.5       
 RET*LIT        -0.001    -0.06        -0.002    -0.12        -0.003    -0.19       
 NEG*RET*LIT   
 
+    0.039    1.13        0.042    1.22        0.045    1.29       
 ST        -0.001    -0.11                            
 NEG*ST        0.023    1.92    *                        
 RET*ST        0.020    1.63    *                        
 NEG*RET*ST   
 
+    0.037    0.80                            
 DT                    -0.002    -0.59                
 NEG*DT                    -0.007    -1.01                
 RET*DT              -0.006    -0.71          
 NEG*RET*DT   
 
+                0.015    0.51                
 STONLY                                0.003    0.43       
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 NEG*STONLY                                0.015    1.23       
 RET*STONLY                                0.005    0.38       
 NEG*RET*STONLY   
 
+                            0.090    1.71    **  
 DTONLY                                -0.001    -0.3       
 NEG*DTONLY                                -0.005    -0.72       
 RET*DTONLY                                -0.007    -0.77       
 NEG*RET*DTONLY   
 
+                            0.037    1.17       
 STDT                                -0.023    -0.92       
 NEG*STDT                                0.050    1.26       
 RET*STDT                                0.058    2.19    **  
 NEG*RET*STDT   
 
+                            -0.038    -0.43       
                                            
 N        4870            4870            4870           
 R2    
 
23.62%           
 
23.64%           
 
23.97%     
 
Note: Using all data available in ExecuComp, CEO performance-based pays (PBP) are sorted by 2-digit SIC 
industry classification and year. The observations are assigned to four groups of equal size, with the lowest 
performance-based pay in group 1 and the highest performance-based pay in group 4. CEOs who move across 
more than one groups in the next two years are classified as highly-variable-pay-structure CEOs (Panel A). Other 
CEOs are low-variable-pay-structure CEOs (Panel B). This information is then matched with the full sample 
described in Table 1. 
Variable definitions: PBP  =  the total annual compensation subtracts salary  
ST  =  1 if the CEO has a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DT  =  1 if the CEO has a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
STONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
DTONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 
otherwise  
STDT  =  1 if the CEO has both a single-trigger severance agreement and a double-
trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
EARN  =  earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity 
at the beginning of the year  
RET  =  the buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year  
NEG  =  1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise  
SIZE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the market value of equity at the beginning 
of the year, scaled by 9  
MTB  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of the market value of equity to 
the book value of equity at the beginning of the year, scaled by 9  
LEVERAGE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of total debt to total assets, scaled 
by 9  
LIT  =  1 if the standard industry classification (SIC) code of the firm falls in one of 
these ranges, 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370-
7374, and 0 otherwise  
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t-values are based on the firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a predicted sign, and two-tailed 
otherwise. 
 
6. Sensitivity Analyses  
The robustness analyses in this section check the possibility of 
endogeneity with the severance agreement variables. Models are re-
run applying an alternative rule to determine the CEO’s significant 
influence in the company. And then, models are re-run employing an 
alternative proxy to determine the pay structures. The inferences are 
qualitatively the same. 
Endogeneity Tests 
To check the robustness of the results, this study conducts 
endogeneity tests on the severance agreement variables. Prior 
literature suggests that firms with unstable performance and a strong 
board are likely to grant severance agreements to CEOs. The proxies 
for these factors are the volatility of stock returns in the previous year, 
the return on assets of the previous year, the size of the board and the 
independence of the board (Rusticus 2006, Rau & Xu 2008). The 
volatility of stock returns is measured as the standard deviation of the 
monthly stock return. The return on assets is calculated as the 
earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. The size of the board is the total number of 
directors on the board, and the independence of the board is the 
percentage of independent directors. This study obtains information 
from CRSP and Compustat to calculate the first two measures, and 
uses information from RiskMetrics’ director dataset to calculate the last 
two measures. This additional requirement for data reduces the size of 
the full sample from 6,986 to 5,062 observations. 
Using the measures above as distinct instrumental variables, the 
Hausman specification tests do not support the hypothesis of 
endogeneity (Hausman and Taylor 1985). Thus, they suggest no 
preference for the two-stage least-squares model (2SLS) over the 
ordinary least-squares model (OLS). The chi-square statistic is 0.97 for 
the model of the single-trigger severance agreement and 2.26 for the 
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model of the double-trigger severance agreement. The p-values are 
equal to 1 in both cases. The endogeneity test for the model of 
granting the severance agreements separately or combined is not 
conducted due to the requirement of eight additional distinct 
instrumental variables (Wooldrige 2002). There are insufficient data to 
satisfy this requirement. Further, using incorrect instruments can lead 
to estimates from the 2SLS more biased than simple OLS estimates 
(Larcker et al. 2008). 
As a further check, this study adds one more instrumental 
variable to the endogeneity tests. Rau and Xu (2008) report that 
institutional ownership is positively related to the value of severance 
pays. The blockholder data provided by Dlugosz etc. (2004) through 
Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS) are from 1996 to 2001. They 
are matched with the full sample based on firm ticker symbol. Only 
1,859 observations have all the required information. Again, the 
Hausman specification tests do not support the 2SLS models. The chi-
square statistics are 11.02 and 1.10, respectively. The p-value is close 
to 1 or equal to 1. In summary, the 2SLS models are not preferable to 
the OLS models in testing the hypotheses of this study. 
Alternative Definition of Significant Influence for 
Departing CEOs  
The tests here are to explore the effect of the definition of 
“significant influence” on the findings from analyzing the departing 
CEO sample. In the main results, a CEO is considered to have a 
significant influence if he is in office for more than nine months during 
a fiscal year. To test the sensitivity of the results to this definition, the 
“nine months” constraint is relaxed to also consider CEOs who were in 
office for more than six months but less than nine months as the 
significantly influential CEO of the year. This change in variable 
specification does not affect the inference on the single-trigger 
severance agreement, as the coefficient on NEG*RET*ST is still 
significantly positive at the conventional level. The coefficient on 
NEG*RET*STONLY is only significant at the 10.9% level, suggesting 
that a heightened association is among CEOs in office for a longer 
period of time in their last year of tenure. 
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Alternative Proxy to Determine the Pay Structure 
Thus far this study has used the level and the change in the 
level of performance-based pay to classify the CEO’s pay structure. An 
alternative approach is to use the volatility of the pay to distinguish 
between highly variable pay structure and low variable pay structure 
CEOs. Volatility is captured by the standard deviation of the CEO’s 
performance-based pay over his tenure. This measure is calculated for 
all CEOs in ExecuComp and the observations are separated into two 
groups by comparing the values with their industry median. 
Observations with above industry median values are in the highly 
variable pay structure group and those with below industry median 
values are in the low variable pay structure group. This information is 
then added to the full sample. The sample loses 230 observations 
because no standard deviation is calculated for the CEOs with only one 
year of compensation data. 
Table 7 reports the results using this new approach. None of the 
coefficients on NEG*RET*DT, NEG*RET*DTONLY or NEG*RET*STDT 
are significant. The coefficients on NEG*RET*ST and 
NEG*RET*STONLY are not significant in Panel B, but they are 
significantly positive in Panel A. The results provide evidence that the 
association between severance agreements specifically the single-
trigger severance agreement and timely disclosure of bad news is 
stronger among CEOs with a highly variable pay structure than among 
CEOs with a low variable pay structure. The findings support H2. 
 
TABLE 7  
Tests on the association between severance agreements and timely disclosure of bad news  
(Sample Partitioned by Volatility of Performance-Based Pay Level) 
Panel A: Highly Variable Pay Structure       
              (I)      (II)     (III)   
 Parameter        Est    t        Est    t        Est    t       
 Intercept        0.046    7.25    ***    0.045    6.91    ***    0.044    6.38    ***  
 NEG        0.012    0.8        0.025    1.54        0.024    1.45       
 RET        0.054    4.4    ***    0.053    4.43    ***    0.057    4.18    ***  
 NEG*RET   
 
+   
 0.276    4.58    ***    0.312    4.90    ***    0.281    4.35    ***  
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 SIZE        0.003    0.4        0.003    0.44        0.003    0.41       
 NEG*SIZE        0.026    1.41        0.024    1.26        0.024    1.28       
 RET*SIZE        0.029    1.85    *    0.029    1.83    *    0.027    1.71    *   
 NEG*RET*SIZE    -    0.017    0.21        0.010    0.13        0.014    0.18       
 MTB        0.007    0.89        0.005    0.73        0.007    0.94       
 NEG*MTB        -0.035    -1.63    *    -0.035    -1.62        -0.035    -1.64    *   
 RET*MTB        -0.051    -3.64    ***    -0.047    -3.93    ***    -0.052    -3.71    ***  
 NEG*RET*MTB    -    -0.337    -3.87    ***    -0.345    -3.94    ***    -0.331    -3.79    ***  
 LEVERAGE        0.006    0.71        0.004    0.53        0.005    0.58       
 NEG*LEVERAGE        -0.010    -0.54        -0.007    -0.42        -0.009    -0.52       
 RET*LEVERAGE        -0.034    -1.65    *    -0.030    -1.49        -0.031    -1.51       
 
NEG*RET*LEVERAGE   
 
+   
 0.055    0.89        0.051    0.83        0.047    0.78       
 LIT        -0.018    -4.23    ***    -0.016    -4.00    ***    -0.017    -4.05    ***  
 NEG*LIT        0.016    1.52        0.013    1.30        0.014    1.36       
 RET*LIT        -0.013    -1.43        -0.017    -1.83    *    -0.014    -1.46       
 NEG*RET*LIT   
 
+   
 0.092    2.25    **    0.091    2.22    **    0.089    2.17    **   
 ST        0.001    0.18                               
 NEG*ST        0.014    1.01                               
 RET*ST        -0.017    -1.31                               
 NEG*RET*ST   
 
+   
 0.095    1.74    **                           
 DT                    0.003    0.83                   
 NEG*DT                    -0.017    -1.91    *               
 RET*DT                    -0.005    -0.75                   
 NEG*RET*DT   
 
+   
             -0.026    -0.72                   
 STONLY                                0.005    0.6       
 NEG*STONLY                                0.005    0.32       
 RET*STONLY                                -0.014    -1.32       
 NEG*RET*STONLY   
 
+   
                         0.114    2.08    **   
 DTONLY                                0.003    0.88       
 NEG*DTONLY                          -0.014    -1.53    
 RET*DTONLY                                -0.006    -0.76   
 NEG*RET*DTONLY   
 
+   
                         0.002    0.05   
 STDT                                -0.016    -0.39   
 NEG*STDT                                -0.017    -0.35   
 RET*STDT                                -0.044    -0.6   
 NEG*RET*STDT   
 
+   
                         -0.119    -1.22   
                                         
 N        3552            3552            3552        
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 R2    
 
26.28%   
        
 
26.16%   
        
 
26.63%   
  
           
Panel B: Low Variable Pay Structure        
         (I)         (II)      (III)     
 Parameter        Est    t        Est    t        Est    t       
 Intercept        0.061    3.39    ***    0.060    3.42    ***    0.060    3.43    ***  
 NEG        -0.012    -0.47        -0.004    -0.17        -0.008    -0.35       
 RET        -0.031    -0.70        -0.015    -0.34        -0.022    -0.49       
 NEG*RET   
 
+   
 0.490    5.48    ***    0.474    5.36    ***    0.471    5.34    ***  
 SIZE        -0.006    -0.42        -0.006    -0.42        -0.005    -0.36       
 NEG*SIZE        -0.008    -0.34        -0.009    -0.36        -0.010    -0.43       
 RET*SIZE        0.102    2.61    ***    0.101    2.49    ***    0.098    2.43    **   
 NEG*RET*SIZE    -    -0.371    -4.22    ***    -0.373    -4.19    ***    -0.372    -4.17    ***  
 MTB        0.029    1.98    **    0.032    2.14    **    0.031    2.08    **   
 NEG*MTB        -0.009    -0.4        -0.012    -0.52        -0.010    -0.43       
 RET*MTB        -0.087    -2.22    **    -0.095    -2.39    **    -0.091    -2.29    **   
 NEG*RET*MTB    -    -0.158    -1.73    **    -0.148    -1.63    *    -0.152    -1.67    *   
 LEVERAGE        -0.033    -2.20    **    -0.031    -2.03    **    -0.032    -2.15    **   
 NEG*LEVERAGE        0.058    2.60    ***    0.056    2.54    ***    0.059    2.64    ***  
 RET*LEVERAGE        0.059    1.44        0.058    1.41        0.059    1.44       
 
NEG*RET*LEVERAGE   
 
+   
 0.052    0.65        0.053    0.66        0.052    0.63       
 LIT        -0.022    -2.83    ***    -0.019    -2.66    ***    -0.020    -2.79    ***  
 NEG*LIT        0.005    0.38        0.003    0.28        0.004    0.36       
 RET*LIT        0.004    0.20        -0.002    -0.09        0.000    0.02       
 NEG*RET*LIT   
 
+   
 0.001    0.02        0.009    0.19        0.011    0.21       
 ST        0.001    0.14                            
 NEG*ST        0.027    1.64    *                        
 RET*ST        0.043    2.35    **                        
 NEG*RET*ST   
 
+   
 -0.003    -0.06                            
 DT                    -0.002    -0.37                
 NEG*DT                    -0.007    -0.62                
 RET*DT              -0.014    -1.04          
 NEG*RET*DT   
 
+   
             0.013    0.30                
 STONLY                                -0.007    -0.70       
 NEG*STONLY                                0.033    1.63    *   
 RET*STONLY                                0.057    2.36    **  
 NEG*RET*STONLY   
 
+   
                         0.019    0.23       
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 DTONLY                                -0.001    -0.23       
 NEG*DTONLY                                -0.005    -0.40       
 RET*DTONLY                                -0.010    -0.65       
 NEG*RET*DTONLY   
 
+   
                         0.020    0.44       
 STDT                                0.013    0.67       
 NEG*STDT                                0.033    0.77       
 RET*STDT                                0.009    0.39       
 NEG*RET*STDT   
 
+   
                         0.015    0.16       
                                            
 N        3202            3202            3202           
 R2    
 
25.70%   
        
 
25.56%   
        
 
25.85%   
  
 
Note: Using all data available in ExecuComp, the volatility (standard deviation) of CEOs’ performance-based pays 
(PBP) are sorted by 2-digit SIC industry classification. The observations are assigned to the highly variable pay group 
(volatility above the industry median) or the low variable pay group (volatility below the industry median). This 
information is then matched with the full sample described in Table 1. 
Variable definitions: PBP  =  the total annual compensation subtracts salary  
ST  =  1 if the CEO has a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DT  =  1 if the CEO has a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
STONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a single-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
DTONLY  =  1 if the CEO has only a double-trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
STDT  =  1 if the CEO has both a single-trigger severance agreement and a double-
trigger severance agreement, and 0 otherwise  
EARN  =  earnings before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity at 
the beginning of the year  
RET  =  the buy-and-hold stock return over the fiscal year  
NEG  =  1 if RET is negative, and 0 otherwise  
SIZE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the market value of equity at the beginning of 
the year, scaled by 9  
MTB  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of the market value of equity to the 
book value of equity at the beginning of the year, scaled by 9  
LEVERAGE  =  the yearly decile rank value of the ratio of total debt to total assets, scaled by 
9  
LIT  =  1 if the standard industry classification (SIC) code of the firm falls in one of 
these ranges, 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, and 7370-
7374, and 0 otherwise  
 
t-values are based on the firm-clustered standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. p-values are one-tailed for coefficients with a predicted sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
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7. Conclusion  
CEO severance agreements present a puzzle because they seem 
not to align with the idea of “pay for performance.” However, they are 
still popular with boards of directors. This study explores one business 
outcome after boards grant severance agreements to the CEOs. This 
study hypothesizes that the existence of ex ante severance 
agreements is positively associated with the timeliness of the 
disclosure of bad news. The prediction is built upon prior literature that 
CEOs care for their own benefit and need incentives to reveal bad 
news (e.g., Levitt and Snyder 1997). Severance agreements provide 
the incentives for CEOs to do so. The tests show that the single-trigger 
severance agreement plays a role in eliciting timely disclosure of bad 
news. The association between this ex ante severance agreement and 
timely disclosure of bad news is positive for CEOs in general (the full 
sample). The association remains valid in the last year of the CEO’s 
tenure where performance is relatively poor and where being aware of 
bad news early is more valuable to the boards than usual (the 
departing CEO sample). Moreover, the association between severance 
agreements and timely disclosure of bad news is stronger among CEOs 
with a highly variable pay structure than among CEOs with a low 
variable pay structure. The results are consistent with the theory of 
information disclosure by Inderst and Mueller (2005) and Laux (2008). 
These results are robust to the control for the possible effects of other 
factors, endogeneity tests and alternative variable specifications. 
This study complements other research on severance 
agreements by providing evidence that the single-trigger severance 
agreement plays a role in obtaining bad news early from the CEOs. It 
also suggests that a highly variable pay structure facilitate the 
severance agreement in playing this role. As the data are pre-selected 
by RiskMetrics, Standard & Poor’s and the CRSP, the inferences are 
most likely to apply to firms with characteristics similar to those 
examined in this study. When more data becomes available, future 
studies could examine the role of severance agreements in a broader 
sample. 
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Note 
1 A significant amount of research has been done on “golden parachute” 
agreements, e.g., Lambert and Larker (1985) study the influence of golden 
parachutes on the CEO’s reaction to the firm takeover bids. “Golden 
parachute” is a name for a special type of severance agreements. It is 
triggered by a change in control of the company and the termination of 
employment. The severance agreement is a broader concept. 
2 “The CEO’s last year of tenure” is used interchangeably with “the departing 
CEO’s last year of significant influence” in this study for the sake of 
simplicity. 
3 This explains the data requirement of more than three observations for each 
year and two-digit SIC combination. 
4 Approximately 48.5% of the CEOs in the ExecuComp sample have no more 
than three years of compensation information: 17.4% has only one year of 
data, 16.9% has two years of data, and 14.1% of the sample has three 
years of data. Going beyond three years gives more weight to CEOs with a 
longer tenure. 
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